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CASE COMMENTS
principles relating to implied warranties should be reason-
ably extended, and that similarly conceived principles
relating to the doctrine of caveat emptor should be reason-
ably restricted in scope in the light of the vast change in
the nature of chattels commonly sold and purchased in
this day.24
Perhaps the language in Williams and Nettles could be used as a
basis for applying the UCC to non-sales transactions in West Virginia.
Baker v. City of Seattle is an example of an accelerating trend
towards using UCC policy in non-sales cases. Baker and the other
cases like it could provide a strong base for extending UCC policy
to bailments for hire in West Virginia. Its theory should not be
overlooked.
Gary L. Hunt
Taxation-Loss Carry-Back
Privileges of F Reorganizations
An individual owned 123 corporations, each engaged in one
of three activities: supplying building materials, constructing low-
cost housing, or marketing houses. These corporations substantially
dealt among themselves and were centrally managed by the Lee
Development Construction Company, Inc. Although each of these
corporations was itself an independent unit, it was also a member
of a larger integrated commercial organization. In 1962 the owner
was seeking continued expansion and merged all the corporations
into Lee Quality Homes Corporation to establish a better credit basis.
Two years later, the corporation changed its legal name to Home
Construction Corporation of America. The only operational changes
caused by the consolidation were adoption of a common tax year
and simplified accounting procedures. The 123 former corporations
became 123 divisions of the Home Construction Corporation of
America.
The parent corporation suffered net operating losses in 1963 and
1964 and filed claims for tax refunds by carrying back the losses "
and setting them off against the taxable income of the 83 previous
24 152 W. Va. 9, 21, 159 S.E.2d 206, 214 (1968).
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corporations which had experienced profitable operations. The In-
ternal Revenue Service denied the refunds. The district court held
the consolidation was an F reorganization under § 368(a) (1) (F) of
the Code, and allowed the carry-backs) The circuit court held,
affirmed and remanded. The consolidation of the 123 corporations
constituted "a mere change in identity, form or place of organiza-
tion" and qualified as an F reorganization. Therefore, the corporation
was entitled to a refund based upon carrying back the loss to profits
of the pre-merger corporations. However, there is a limitation to
the carry-back-"only such portion of the overall loss as can be
shown to be attributable to each respective separate division within
the new structure may be carried back, and then only be offset
against gains of such division's pre-merger counterpart."2 Home
Construction Corporation of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1971).
The F reorganization provision of the Code3 has had a perplexing
career. Two contrary arguments have been advanced concerning its
definition. The first contends it pertains exclusively to single corpora-
tions, while the second asserts that it refers to the consolidation of
several corporations. Both arguments have been advanced by the
Commissioner and taxpayers at various times depending on the
context in which the issue arose. The significance of a particular
contention depends upon whose interest is involved in the litigation.
It may be the tax consequences to the shareholder or the carry-back
position of the newly organized corporation.
Assuming the shareholders are substantially the same in the
post-merger corporation as in the pre-merger entity, the cash received
by the shareholders in a liquidation/reincorporation may be treated
as follows: (1) if the reincorporation is treated as an F reorganiza-
tion, the cash received is taxed as a cash dividend, i.e., ordinary in-
come;' (2) if the liquidation/reincorporation is not an F reorganiza-
I Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 830(S.D. Ala. 1969).
2 Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1172
(5th Cir. 1971).
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(1) [hereinafter, references to the
Internal Revenue Code will be to the section number alone] sets forth six
definitions of the term "reorganization." Reorganizations have been classified
as A,B,CD,E or F according to the subparagraph of § 368(a)(1) which
defines each. An F reorganization is defined as "a mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization, however effected." § 368(a) (1) (F).
4 §§ 354-56.
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tion, the cash received is taxed at the lower capital gains rate.8
Therefore, it is not personally advantageous to the shareholders to
have a liquidation/reincorporation classified as an F reorganization.
The shareholders in Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner6 argued
that the merger of brother and sister corporations did not constitute
an F oganization, but the Commissioner contended such reorganiza-
tion included a consolidation of multiple corporations.' The court
agreed with the Commissioner and did not limit the F reorganization
to single corporations.
The Commissioner reasserted the Pridemark argument in Davant
v. Commissioner8 where the shareholders also merged two corpora-
tions. They engaged in a transaction characterized as a "sale" so
they could obtain gains treatment on the cash received for their
stock. The court declared that multi-entity reorganizations can con-
stitute F reorganizations.
Unfortunately, the Commissioner may have realized too late
the repercusions which his arguments in Pridemark and Davant would
have on the carry-back privileges of some corporations.9 If a rein-
corporation receives an F classification, the newly formed corporation
is entitled to loss carry-back privileges under § 381 of the Code."0
This becomes important if, for example, a newly formed acquiring
s §§ 331, 337, 1002.
6 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). Brother and sister corporations, X and Y,
sold part of their assets to Z, a corporation with which they had dealings.
X and Y then distributed the remainder of their assets and proceeds from
the sale. Upon liquidation the individuals reassigned the assets and part of
the cash to a trust. The trust then exchanged the cash and assets for stock
in a newly created corporation. The tax court held that an F reorganization
had taken place and not a complete liquidation as claimed by the stock-
holders. Therefore, distribution of cash was a dividend and not property
received in exchange for the stock upon a complete liquidation. On appeal, the
court found no substantial discontinuance of business and characterized the
liquidation/reincorporation as an F reorganization.71d. at 42.
8 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). X
and Y were two integrated corporations owned by the same shareholders. The
shareholders decided to transfer the operating assets of X to Y, while with-
drawing the excess corporate assets at capital gains rates. They sold the
stock of X corporation to a "straw man" who in turn sold the assets of X to
Y, thus "liquidating" X. The Commissioner contended there was not a bona
fide liquidation. The tax court characterized the reorganization as an F type.
On appeal the circuit court affirmed the tax court's holding.
9 Pugh, The F Reorganization: Reveille for a Sleeping Giant, 24 TAx
L. Rav. 437, 459 (1969).
Section 381(b)(3) prohibits the acquiring corporation in a reorganiza-
tion from carrying back a net operating loss to the pre-merger corporations
unless the reorganization is an F one.
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corporation experiences a loss during its initial years of post-merger
operation."
Therefore, when the interest in the litigation relates to the carry-
back privilege of the acquiring corporation, the litigant's contentions
regarding F reorganization are directly opposed to those advanced
when the interest is the tax consequences to the shareholder. Two
closely related cases, Stauffer v. Commissioner" and Associated
Machine v. Commissioner," illustrate this. In both instances the
corporate taxpayers were the result of business mergers and had
post-merger losses to carry back to the pre-merger corporations. The
Commissioner completely reversed his argument of Pridemark and
Davant and asserted that those decisions were erroneous. 4 Of course
the taxpayers were more than willing to use the precedent he had
established in those cases. The court, undaunted by the Com-
missioners reversal of position, emphasized that the definition of F
reorganization encompasses multi-corporation reorganizations."
Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service released a Revenue
Ruling declaring that it would not follow the Pridemark, Davant,
Stauffer and Associated Machine decisions.' 6 Home Construction was
decided after the ruling and affirmed the previous cases, completely
disregarding the Commissioner's ruling.
The Home Construction case is also of some significance be-
cause it was decided subsequent to the Tax Reform Act of 1969.'1
" See Pugh, supra note 10, at 457.
12 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968). X, Y and Z were corporations operating
in different states and conducting separate but similiar businesses. The three
corporations consolidated into new M corporation. All the stock in X, Y,
and Z and the new M corporation was owned by the same person. M corpora-
tion realized unexpected losses and wished to carry them back to the pre-
merger corporations. The tax court ruled there was not an F reorganization,
but the circuit court reversed stating that a multi-corporation reorganization
can constitute an F reorganization.
'1 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968). X, a profitable corporation, was merged
into the operating but unprofitable Y corporation. Both were owned by the
same shareholders. The court held that the merger was an F reorganization.
14 See Pugh, supra note 10, at 459-60.
" See Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968): Asso-
ciated Machine v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968).
1 Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 Cut, BULL. 108:
The Internal Revenue Service will not follow the decisions of the
court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit ... nor that portion of the
decision of the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit... dealing with
the question whether a combination of two or more commonly owned
operating corporations may qualify as a reorganization within the
meaning of section 368(a)(1)(F) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.7
7Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
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If Congress had intended the interpretation given an F reorganization
by the Commissioner, the Tax Reform Act might have reflected
this. The lack of change in the subsection would seem to indicate that
the prior court decisions accurately reflected congressional intent. 8
The court searched through the legislative history for a defini-
tion of F reorganization, but it could not find one. Therefore, it
took cognizance of the economic realities involved, i.e., the new
corporation was identical in substance to the 123 former corpora-
tions. The form of the organization had changed, but the nature of
the entity had remained substantially the same. "A mere change
in identity [or] form" depends on a change in form rather than a
change in the substance.9 Home Construction was merely an alter
ego of the pre-merger corporations. The court realized no precise
definition was possible.20
It also realized that restriction to "a mere change in identity
[or] form" must be guaranteed by imposing some limitations. Those
applied in this case were: (1) There must be "identity of proprietary
interests in the transferor and transferee."2' Substantially the same
ownership must exist in the post-merger corporation as the pre-
merger corporation. (2) It is necessary to have an "uninterupted con-
tinuity of business."22 The fundamental business operations of the
merging corporations cannot cease or change prior to or during the
reorganization. (3) The pre-merger corporations must engage "in
the same or integrated activities."23 The reorganized entities are
required to be in the same type of business. (4) And naturally "a
18 This theory was advanced in Brief for Appellee at 27, Home Constr.
Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971):
On December 30, 1969, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969
which was the most exhaustive and comprehensive rewriting of the
substantive tax laws in our history. This amendment which was 313
pages in length, was written with full knowledge and benefit of the
rule expressed in the Davant, Stauffer and Associated Machine
decisions that an F reorganization depends not on a "one active
corporation" rule but rather on continuity of business substance-
yet it contained not one word to alter that rule .... [I]t contained
nothing to limit F reorganizations to cases involving only one
operating corporation.
,9 Home Const. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1170(5th Cir. 1971).
2The court noted that the definition of an F reorganization sometimes
overlaps definitions of the other § 368 categories, but it stated that reor-
ganizations which fit within both the F classification and another are still
entitled to the benefits of the F category.
21 439 F.2d at 1171.22 1d.
2 3 1d.
5
Moyle: Taxation--Loss Carry-back Privileges of F Reorganizations
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
legitimate business purpose independent of and in addition to the
tax consequences of the merger" is essential.24
The resultant enterprise in Home Construction satisfied these
conditions. The 123 corporations were owned by the same share-
holder. The corporate aspects of manufacturing, construction and
selling were not substantially affected by the reorganization. The
pre-merger corporations continued in the low-cost housing business,
and the primary reason for the reorganization was to secure a better
credit basis.
Even though all limitations are met, an F reorganization has no
benefits without proper accounting procedures. It is basic that "an
after-merger taxpayer may not obtain any more favorable tax treat-
ment than it would have received had the loss occurred under the
business's pre-merger form."25 Therefore, the taxpayer is required to
separate the net operating loss into taxable units identical to the
pre-merger corporations, and only the net operating losses of those
units which had pre-merger profits may be carried back. The loss
carry-back attributed to the taxable unit is limited to the prior years'
profits of that unit's pre-merger counterpart.26 To allow the total loss
to be offset against the total profits would permit a more favorable
tax treatment to the taxpayer.
The F reorganization requirements reveal that the tax con-
sequences are of importance primarily to small, closely held corpora-
tions and not to larger, publicly held enterprises. Although many
public mergers are substantially within these limitations, there is
usually little or none of the required identity of ownership in the
transferor and transferee. If this is true, the decision in Home Con-
struction may enable close corporations owned by substantially the
same shareholders to merge without the consequence that income tax
credits of the pre-merger corporations will automatically be lost.
Michael J. Moyle
24 1d. at 1172.
2, Id.
6Id. See also § 172 which provides the proper procedures for carrying
back loss.
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